KOMITE NASIONAL KESELAMATAN TRANSPORTASI
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

PRELIMINARY

KNKT.26.04.04.04

Aircraft Accident Investigation Report

PT Matthew Air Nusantara

Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2; PK-CFX

Puntak Hill, Sekadau, West Kalimantan

Republic of Indonesia

16 April 2026

2026

This Written Preliminary Report is published by the Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (KNKT), Transportation Building, 3rd Floor, Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5 Jakarta 10110, Indonesia.

The report is the result of an investigation conducted by the KNKT in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the Indonesian Aviation Act (UU No. 1/2009), and Government Regulation (PP No. 62/2013).

The Written Preliminary Report contains the facts ascertained up to the date of publication and is intended to provide information on the progress of the safety investigation. The information contained in the Written Preliminary Report may be incomplete, may change in the course of the investigation or new relevant facts may become known that have not yet been taken into account. This report does not include analysis and conclusions.

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Jakarta, 25 May 2026
KOMITE NASIONAL
KESELAMATAN TRANSPORTASI
CHAIRMAN

SOERJANTO TJAHJONO

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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

AFTN	:	Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network
AGL	:	Above Ground Level
AIR	:	Airborne Image Recording
AMSL	:	Above Mean Sea Level
AOC	:	Air Operator Certificate
ATS	:	Air Traffic Services
ATSRO	:	Air Traffic Services Reporting Office
BASARNAS	:	*Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan* (the Indonesian Search and Rescue Agency)
BEA	:	*Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile* (the France Independent Investigation Authority)
BMKG	:	*Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi, dan Geofisika* (the Bureau of Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics of Indonesia)
CASR	:	Civil Aviation Safety Regulations
CPL-H	:	Commercial Pilot License for Helicopter
ETA	:	Estimated Time of Arrival
FIC	:	Flight Information Center
GPS	:	Global Positioning System
HF	:	High Frequency
HLO	:	Helicopter Landing Officer
HTAWS	:	Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System
ICAO	:	International Civil Aviation Organization
KNKT	:	*Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi* (the Indonesia Independent Investigation Authority)
LT	:	Local Time
MOCA	:	Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude
OCC	:	Operational Control Center
OM	:	Operations Manual
OM-A	:	Operations Manual Part A
OM-C	:	Operations Manual Part C
ONC	:	Operational Navigation Chart
PIC	:	Pilot in Command
SAR	:	Search and Rescue
SD	:	Secure Digital
UTC	:	Universal Time Coordinated
VFR	:	Visual Flight Rules
VHF	:	Very High Frequency

SYNOPSIS

On 16 April 2026, at 0734 LT, an Airbus Helicopters EC130 T2 registered PK-CFX, departed from CMA landing spot, Melawi to GAN1 landing spot, Kubu Raya, via Nanga Pinoh Airport (WIOG) for an unscheduled passenger flight. On board the helicopter were one pilot and seven passengers, including one company aircraft engineer.

The helicopter was dispatched within the weight and balance limit and prior to the departure, there was no report of helicopter system malfunction. The filed air traffic control (ATC) flight plan indicated a cruising altitude of 1,500 feet.

After airborne, the helicopter entered Jakarta Sector airspace, which was classified as Class G Airspace (uncontrolled airspace). The flight was monitored by the Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) at Jakarta office and the Operational Control Center (OCC) officer at the Balikpapan office using the Spidertracks flight-following system.

At 0812 LT, the Spidertracks system indicated no further movement from the helicopter. The last position report in the flight-following system was at coordinates 0°10'51.91" S, 110°47'25.49" E. Attempts to contact the helicopter were unsuccessful.

At 0839 LT, an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) signal from the PK-CFX helicopter was received by *Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan* /BASARNAS (Indonesia Search and Rescue Agency). The signal was transmitted from forested area approximately 80 Nm east of Supadio Airport (WIOO), Pontianak. Subsequently, the search and rescue team was assembled, assisted by the local police, the air force, the army, and local residents near the last known position of the helicopter.

At 1402 LT, the wreckage of PK-CFX was located about 1.7 Nm west of the last reported position in the flight following system in hilly terrain at an elevation of approximately 1,500 feet. The accident was not survivable, and all eight occupants sustained fatal injuries.

France *Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile* (BEA), as the State of Design and Manufacture, participated in the investigation and appointed an Accredited Representative in accordance with ICAO Annex 13.

At the time of issuing this report, KNKT had been informed of safety actions taken by the aircraft operator in response to the accident. These safety actions were considered relevant to improving safety; however, the investigation identified remaining safety issues that need to be addressed. Therefore, KNKT issued safety recommendations to the aircraft operator.

The investigation is continuing, and should any further relevant safety issues emerge during the course of the investigation, KNKT will immediately bring the issues to the attention of the relevant parties and publish them as required.

1 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the Flight

On 16 April 2026, an Airbus Helicopters EC130 T2 registered PK-CFX, operated by PT Matthew Air Nusantara (MAN), conducted an unscheduled passenger flight from CMA landing spot, Melawi[1] to GAN1 landing spot, Kubu Raya[2]. This flight was chartered by a palm oil plantation company.

Based on the filled air traffic control (ATC) flight plan, the flight would be operated under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) with a cruising altitude of 1,500 feet, the total estimated elapsed time was 1 hour 15 minutes, and the fuel endurance would be sufficient for a two-hours flight. The route in the ATC flight plan indicated that the helicopter would fly from CMA landing spot to GAN1 landing spot via Nanga Pinoh Airport (WIOG), Melawi. Along the flight plan route, there was a terrain area with highest terrain elevation of about 2,800 feet (see Figure 1).

At 0034 UTC (0734 LT)[3], on daylight condition, the helicopter departed from Melawi. Prior to the departure, there was no report of helicopter system malfunction. On board the helicopter were one pilot and seven passengers including one company aircraft engineer. After airborne, the helicopter entered Jakarta Sector airspace, which was classified as Class G Airspace (uncontrolled airspace). The airspace was provided with flight information service[4] by Jakarta Flight Information Center (FIC) using High Frequency (HF) radio communication. No pilot communication transmissions were recorded in the Jakarta FIC HF ground-based communication recording, as the helicopter was not equipped with HF radio communication.

The flight was monitored by the Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) at Jakarta office and the Operational Control Center (OCC) officer at the Balikpapan office using the Spidertracks[5] flight-following system.

At 0812 LT, the flight following system indicated that there was no further movement from the helicopter. The last position report in the flight following system indicated that the helicopter was at coordinates 0°10’51.91” S, 110°47’25.49” E. The HLO then attempted to contact the pilot and the company aircraft engineer who were on board the helicopter using cellular telephone communication; however, there was no response from either occupant.

The HLO attempted to locate the PK-CFX helicopter by contacting the representative of palm oil plantation company at the destination landing spot and Pontianak ATS provider personnel. All attempts to locate the helicopter were unsuccessful.

[1] CMA landing spot, located at coordinates 00°21′40.00″ S, 112°05′36.00″ E.
[2] GAN1 landing spot, located at coordinates 0°16'43.00" S, 109°43'58.00" E.
[3] The 24-hours clock in Local Time (LT) is used in this report to describe the time as specific events occurred. Local Time (LT) is Universal Time Coordinated (UTC)+7 hours.
[4] Flight Information service is a service provided for the purpose of giving advice and information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights.
[5] Spidertracks is a satellite-based aircraft tracking system that provides real-time position reporting and flight monitoring, primarily used for fleet management and flight safety support in remote areas where radar coverage is limited.

At 1402 LT, the wreckage of PK-CFX was found at approximately 1.7 Nm west of the last reported position in the flight following system, in a hilly area at an elevation of about 1,500 feet.



Figure 1: The flight route of PK-CFX

1.2 Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Flight crew	Passengers	Total in Aircraft	Others
Fatal	1	7	8	-
Serious	-	-	-	-
Minor	-	-	-	-
None	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	1	7	8	-

The pilot, and five passengers were Indonesian nationals, while the two remaining passengers were Malaysian national.

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

The helicopter was destroyed.

1.4 Other Damage

There was no other damage to property and/or the environment.

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Pilot Information

Gender	: Male
Age	: 44 Years
Nationality	: Indonesia
Marital status	: Married
Date of joining company	: 1 November 2019

License	:	Commercial Pilot Licence for Helicopter (CPL-H)
Date of issue	:	09 June 2015
Aircraft type rating	:	EC130; Bell 212/412; AW109; AW139
Instrument rating validity	:	21 November 2016
Medical certificate	:	First Class
Last of medical	:	26 November 2025
Validity	:	3 June 2026
Medical limitation	:	Holder shall wear corrective lenses for near and distant vision
Last line check	:	13 December 2025
Last proficiency check	:	13 December 2025
Flying experience		
Total hours	:	4,068 hours
Total on type	:	1,596.2 hours
Last 90 days	:	61.2 hours
Last 30 days	:	19.0 hours
Last 7 days	:	3.2 hours
Last 24 hours	:	1.8 hours
This flight	:	0.7 hours

Based on the flight record provided by the aircraft operator from 18 January 2020 until the day of the accident, the PIC had flew from CMA landing spot to GAN1 landing spot twice, including the accident flight. The previous flight was conducted on 30 May 2024. The PIC had also operated several flights on similar routes from CMA landing spot to other landing spots located near GAN1 landing spot. The most recent similar flight was conducted on 26 February 2026 from CMA landing spot to GAN MILL landing spot, which was located approximately 11 Nm north of GAN1 landing spot.

1.6 Aircraft Information

1.6.1 General

Registration Mark	:	PK-CFX
Manufacturer	:	Airbus Helicopters
Country of Manufacturer	:	French
Type/Model	:	H130 (EC-130T2)
Serial Number	:	8,304
Year of Manufacture	:	2017

Certificate of Airworthiness

Date of issue	:	17 January 2026
Validity	:	16 January 2027
Category	:	Normal
Limitation	:	None

Certificate of Registration

Number	:	4,191
Date of issue	:	17 January 2026
Validity	:	16 January 2029
Time Since New	:	1,365 hours 26 minutes
Cycles Since New	:	2,559
Last Major Check	:	16 October 2025
Last Minor Check	:	13 April 2026

The helicopter was dispatched within the weight and balance limit.

1.6.2 Engines

Manufacturer	:	Safran Turbomeca
Type/Model	:	Arriel 2D
Serial Number-1 engine	:	50,949
Time Since New	:	1,365 hours 26 minutes
Cycle Since New	:	2,559

1.6.3 Collision Avoidance Systems

The helicopter was not equipped with a Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS), as it was not required by the current Indonesia regulations for this type of aircraft.

1.7 Meteorological Information

The flight dispatch form signed by the PIC for the accident flight indicated that the meteorological information had been obtained prior to commencing the flight. The meteorological information included in the document was an enhanced infrared weather satellite imagery[6] from *Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi, dan Geofisika/BMKG* (Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysical Agency of Indonesia) at 0600 LT (2300 UTC) for the whole Indonesia territory (see figure 2) and weather forecast for Supadio Airport (WIOO), Pontianak at 0600 LT. The investigation did not find any weather forecast along the route of the accident flight.

[6] Enhanced infrared weather satellite imagery is a weather satellite product that maps the temperature of cloud tops, allowing meteorologists to quickly spot severe storms and heavy rainfall.



Figure 2: Satellite imagery in the flight dispatch document

According to witness who were at a palm oil plantation near the accident site, at about 0830 LT on the day of the accident, the weather in the area was cloudy. At that time, the witness heard the sound of a helicopter flying overhead; however, the helicopter could not be visually identified due to the cloud conditions.

1.8 Aids to Navigation

The aircraft operator Operation Manual Part C (OM-C) that contains area, route and aerodrome information did not include route guide for a flight from Melawi to Kubu Raya. The investigation also did not find any other company document that includes minimum flight altitude for a flight from Melawi to Kubu Raya.

Based on the flight release form signed by the PIC for the accident flight, it was indicated that there was printed Operational Navigation Chart (ONC) at a scale of 1:1,000,000 on board the helicopter. The printed ONC contained topographical information, including coastlines, terrain relief, mountain elevations, populated areas, as well as facilities and obstacles.

The helicopter was fitted with Global Positioning System (GPS) that allowed the pilot to create, edit and store several flight plans with waypoints on each flight plan. The GPS can use direct point-to-point navigation to provide guidance from a certain point or position to another point on the flight plan.

1.9 Communications

The helicopter was equipped with two very high frequency (VHF) radio communication systems, and both were serviceable. The helicopter was not equipped with HF radio communication.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

The flight departed from CMA landing spot prepared by the palm oil plantation company at coordinates 0°21'40.00" S, 112° 5'36.00" E, approximately 162 Nm east of Pontianak. The CMA landing spot elevation was 240 feet.

The intended destination was GAN1 landing spot which also prepared by the palm oil plantation company at coordinates 0°16'43.00" S, 109°43'58.00" E, approximately 21 Mn southeast of Pontianak at an elevation of 34 feet.

1.11 Flight Recorders

The helicopter was not fitted with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder. Neither recorder was required by current Indonesian aviation regulations.

The helicopter was fitted with Appareo Vision 1000 airborne image recording (AIR) system, which was capable of capturing image data (cockpit view), audio, and inertial data (GPS and attitude). All the data was stored on an SD data card and internal memory module.

The Appareo Vision 1000 unit was recovered from the accident site and transported to the KNKT recorder facility. The SD data card was not found in the Appareo Vision 1000 unit. KNKT recorded facility did not have the capability to perform data readout from its internal memory module, therefore, KNKT plans to transport the Appareo Vision 1000 to the *Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile* (BEA) recorder facility, which has the capability to conduct the data readout.

The helicopter installed with flight following system manufactured by Spider Tracks Limited. The reporting parameters in the flight following system contained several data including time, coordinate, GPS aircraft altitude, ground speed and bearing. The last recorded position in the flight following system indicated the helicopter was at about 1.7 NM southeast of the accident site with the last altitude recorded of 1,582 feet.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The accident site was located in a hilly area characterized by steep terrain. The wreckage was found at an elevation of approximately 1,500 feet, at coordinates 0°10'38.24" S, 110°45'42.84" E. All wreckage was contained within a radius of 15 meters and was located approximately 43 meters from the hilltop.



Figure 3 The accident site



Figure 4 PK-CFX wreckage

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

Should any medical or pathological information be available, it will be included in the final report.

1.14 Fire

There was no evidence of in-flight or post-impact fire.

1.15 Survival Aspects

At 0839 LT, the head quarter of *Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan* /BASARNAS (Indonesia Search and Rescue Agency) received an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) signal from the PK-CFX helicopter. The signal was transmitted from a forested area approximately 80 Nm east of Supadio Airport (WIOO), Pontianak.

The BASARNAS subsequently gathered relevant information regarding PK-CFX helicopter from the operator and ATS provider. The search and rescue team was assembled immediately, assisted by the local police, the air force, the army, and local residents near the last known position of the helicopter.

At 0850 LT, corresponding to the estimated time of arrival (ETA) of the helicopter at Kubu Raya, the HLO contacted representative of the palm oil plantation company at the destination landing spot regarding the arrival status of the helicopter. The personnel informed the HLO that the helicopter had not arrived at the landing spot.

At 0900 LT, the HLO contacted the Pontianak Air Traffic Service (ATS) provider to determine whether the PK-CFX pilot had established communication with any ATS personnel. The Pontianak ATS provider personnel informed the HLO that no communication had been transmitted from the PK-CFX pilot. The HLO then asked the Pontianak ATS provider personnel to call the pilot in radio communication frequency and asked another aircraft pilot that was flying near PK-CFX flight path to locate the helicopter. All attempts to locate the helicopter were unsuccessful.

At 1000 LT (1 hour 23 minutes after the departure of the helicopter), the ATS Provider broadcasted a distress phase message (DETRESFA) through Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN).

At 1402 LT, the search and rescue team subsequently located the wreckage of PK-CFX, the accident was not survivable.

1.16 Tests and Research

Test and research information were not available at the time of the issuance of this report. Should any relevant tests and/or research information be obtained during this investigation, it will be included in the Final Report.

1.17 Organizational and Management Information

1.17.1 Aircraft Operator

The helicopter was operated by PT Matthew Air Nusantara (MAN), which held a valid Air Operator Certificate (AOC) No. AOC-015.

MAN was authorized by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) to conduct commercial air transportation for passengers, in accordance with the operation manual and applicable Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR). The flight operations were subject to a special limitation of daylight VFR only.

MAN had established Operations Manuals (OM) approved by the DGCA to provide guidance for operational and management personnel in the conduct of flight operations.

1.17.1.1 Flight Preparation

The Operations Manual Part A: General (OM-A) Subchapter 3.3.1 states:

> *...PT. Matthew Air Nusantara uses Pilot Self Dispatch systems for dispatching. But even though PT. Matthew Air Nusantara adopt self-dispatch system, HLO will be provided to assist pilot to prepare Flight Plan, weather reports, NOTAM, passenger and cargo manifest and other documents required related to the flight, PIC will review of documents relating to the proposed flight and signing for his acceptance of the flight release.*

The OM-A Subchapter 3.4.5 describes that that a flight dispatch release becomes valid only after the Pilot in Command (PIC) completes and signs the operational flight plan, confirming that the flight can be conducted safely. Prior to signing the operational flight plan, the PIC is required to receive a pre-flight briefing. The briefing shall contain essential operational information, including information from airport aeronautical data and meteorological data. The MAN will provide Aeronautical Information Publication and route manual as the source of the airport aeronautical data. The meteorological data shall include the weather forecast and satellite imagery that can be obtained from the Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysical Agency of Indonesia.

The OM-A Subchapter 7.7.1 states:

> *...*
>
> *PT. Matthew Air Nusantara pilot shall not begin a flight without first having ensured that he has available current and forecast weather information and navigational data - including track, headings, terrain, time, and distances enroute to complete the flight safely and land with required fuel reserves.*
>
> *A pilot shall have on each flight:*
>
> *a. An appropriate map of the area(s) in which flight(s) will be conducted;*
>
> *b. A means to calculate map distances, track and headings;*
>
> *...*

1.17.1.2 VFR Weather Minimum

The OM-A Subchapter 7.5 states:

> *PT. Matthew Air Nusantara pilot will commence a VFR flight provided the latest available ceiling and visibility reports or forecasts indicate that the weather conditions along the route to be flown and at the destination airport/landing site indicates the flight could be conducted under VFR.*

The Subchapter 7.5 of OM-A also describes the basic VFR weather minimums for operations in Class G airspace as follows:

Airspace	*Flight Visibility*	*Distance from Clouds*
Class G	*8 km above 10.000 feet* *5 km below 10.000 feet.* *The higher of: 3000 feet AMSL 5 km, or 1000 feet AGL in sight of the surface*	*1,000 feet above* *1,000 feet above* *1,500 meters horizontal* *Clear of clouds*

1.17.1.3 Minimum Flight Altitude

OM-A Subchapter 7.3.1, describes minimum flight altitude requirements as follows:

Except when necessary for takeoff or landing, no person may operate an aircraft below the following altitudes:

a. *Anywhere. An altitude allowing, if a power unit fails, an emergency landing without undue hazard to persons or property on the surface.*
b. *Over congested areas. Over any congested area of a city, town, or settlement, or over any open air assembly of persons, an altitude of 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 600 meters of the aircraft.*
c. *Over other than congested areas. An altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 200 meters to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.*

   Note:

   - *Helicopters may be operated at less than the minimums prescribed in Paragraph (b) or (c) of this section if the operation is conducted without hazard to persons or property on the surface.*
   - *Day VFR operations. No person may operate any aircraft under VFR during the day at an altitude less than 1,000 feet above the surface or less than 1,000 feet from any mountain, hill, or other obstruction to flight.*
   - *By means of aeronautical charts or other approved documents, establish the minimum obstruction clearance altitude (MOCA) along each segment of the route. The MOCA for each route segment must ensure a minimum of 2000 feet vertical clearance above the highest obstacle located within a horizontal distance of 10 miles from the centerline of the route.*

1.18 Additional Information

The investigation is continuing, should any further relevant safety issues emerge during the course of the investigation, KNKT will immediately bring the issues to the attention of the relevant parties and publish them as required.

France *Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile* (BEA), as the State of Design and Manufacture, participated in the investigation and appointed an Accredited Representative, in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 provisions.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

The investigation was conducted in accordance with the KNKT approved policies and procedures, and in accordance with the standards and recommended practices of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.

2 FINDINGS

The findings are statements of all significant conditions, events or circumstances in the accident sequence. The findings are significant steps in the accident sequence, but they are not always causal or indicate deficiencies. Some findings point out the conditions that pre-existed the accident sequence, but they are usually essential to the understanding of the occurrence, usually in chronological order.

In this occurrence, the KNKT identified several findings as follows:

1. The helicopter had valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A), dispatched within the weight and balance limit. Prior to the departure, there was no report of helicopter system malfunction.
2. The helicopter was not equipped with a Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (HTAWS), as it was not required by the current Indonesia regulations for this type of aircraft.
3. The pilot held a valid Commercial Pilot License and a valid Class 1 Medical Certificate.
4. Based on the flight record from 18 January 2020 until the day of the accident, the PIC had flown from CMA landing spot to GAN1 landing spot twice, including the accident flight. The previous flight was conducted on 30 May 2024.
5. The PIC had operated several flights on similar routes from CMA landing spot to other landing spots located near GAN1 landing spot. The most recent similar flight was conducted on 26 February 2026 from CMA landing spot to GAN MILL landing spot (approximately 11 Nm north of GAN1 landing spot).
6. At 0034 UTC (0734 LT), PK-CFX departed from a landing spot at CMA, Melawi, for an unscheduled passenger flight to GAN1 landing spot at Kubu Raya via Nanga Pinoh Airport (WIOG) under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).
7. The filed air traffic control (ATC) flight plan indicated a cruising altitude of 1,500 feet. Along the flight plan route, there was a terrain area with highest terrain elevation of about 2,800 feet.
8. After airborne, the helicopter entered Jakarta Sector airspace, which was classified as Class G Airspace (uncontrolled airspace).
9. The Jakarta Sector airspace was provided with flight information service by Jakarta Flight Information Center (FIC) using High Frequency (HF) radio communication.
10. No pilot communication transmissions were recorded in the Jakarta FIC HF ground-based communication recording, as the helicopter was not equipped with HF radio communication.
11. The flight was monitored by the Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO) at Jakarta office and the Operational Control Center (OCC) officer at the Balikpapan office using the Spidertracks flight-following system.

12. At 0812 LT, the Spidertracks system indicated that there was no further movement from the helicopter. The last position report in the Spidertracks system was at coordinates 0°10'51.91" S, 110°47'25.49" E.
13. The HLO attempted to locate the PK-CFX helicopter by contacting the pilot and the company aircraft engineer who were on board the helicopter using cellular telephone, the representative of palm oil plantation company at the destination landing spot, and Pontianak ATS provider personnel. All attempts to locate the helicopter were unsuccessful.
14. At 0839 LT, an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) signal from the PK-CFX helicopter was received by *Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan* /BASARNAS (Indonesia Search and Rescue Agency). The signal was transmitted from forested area approximately 80 Nm east of Supadio Airport (WIOO), Pontianak.
15. BASARNAS assembled search and rescue team immediately, assisted by the local police, the air force, the army, and local residents near the last known position of the helicopter.
16. At 1000 LT (1 hour 23 minutes after the departure of the helicopter), the ATS Provider broadcasted a distress phase message (DETRESFA) through Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN).
17. At 1402 LT, the search and rescue team located the PK-CFX wreckage, about 1.7 Nm west of the last recorded Spidertracks position.
18. The accident site was located in a hilly area characterized by steep terrain at an elevation of approximately 1,500 feet. All wreckage was contained within a radius of 15 meters and was located approximately 43 meters from the hilltop.
19. The accident was not survivable, and all occupants sustained fatal injuries.
20. The aircraft operator held a valid Air Operator Certificate (AOC) and was to conduct commercial air transportation, in a daylight VFR only.
21. The aircraft operator used pilot self-dispatch system as described in the Operation Manual Part A (OM-A), Subchapter 3.3.1, however, the company provided Helicopter Landing Officer to assist pilot preparing operational documents including flight plan and weather report.
22. OM-A Subchapter 3.4.5 describes that that a flight dispatch release becomes valid only after the Pilot in Command (PIC) completes and signs the operational flight plan, confirming that the flight can be conducted safely.
23. Prior to signing the operational flight plan, the OM-A Subchapter 3.4.5 requires PIC to receive a pre-flight briefing containing essential operational information, including information from airport aeronautical data and meteorological data.
24. OM-A Subchapter 3.4.5 states that the aircraft operator will provide Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) and route manual as the source of the airport aeronautical data. While meteorological data can be obtained from the Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysical Agency of Indonesia.

25. The aircraft operator Operation Manual Part C (OM-C), that contains area, route and aerodrome information, did not include route a guide for a flight from CMA landing spot to GAN1 landing spot. The investigation also did not find any other company document that specified the minimum flight altitude for that particular route.

26. OM-A Subchapter 7.3.1 prohibits pilots operating aircraft under day VFR unless the altitude is less than 1,000 feet above the surface or less than 1,000 feet from any mountain, hill, or other obstruction to flight.

27. OM-A Subchapter 7.5 states that prior commencing VFR flight, pilots are required to obtain the latest available meteorological information including weather reports or forecasts along the route to be flown for ensuring that the flight could be conducted under VFR.

28. The flight dispatch form signed by the PIC indicated that the meteorological information had been obtained prior to commencing the flight. However, it did not contain weather forecast information along the intended route.

29. Weather information available in the flight documents was limited to enhanced infrared weather satellite imagery covering the whole Indonesian territory and weather forecast information for Supadio Airport (WIOO), Pontianak at 0600 LT (1 hours 30 minute before the departure).

30. Witness who was at a palm oil plantation near the accident site reported hearing the sound of a helicopter flying overhead at about 0830 LT; however, the helicopter could not be visually identified due to cloudy conditions.

3 SAFETY ACTION

At the time of issuing this report, KNKT had been informed of safety actions resulting from this occurrence taken by the aircraft operator.

3.1 Matthew Air Nusantara

The aircraft operator issued operations notice and safety notice which reminded all pilots to implement several radio communication procedures, including the requirement for pilot to maintain two-way radio communication with air traffic controller, flight information center officer or flight operations officer.

To address terrain awareness concerns, the aircraft operator reviewed the feasibility and regulatory requirements for Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) installations.

For weather information improvement, the aircraft operator coordinated with Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysical Agency of Indonesia (BMKG) to obtain more detailed enroute weather information, and asked the BMKG to provide weather-related training for pilots and Flight Operations Officers/Helicopter Landing Officers (FOO/HLO), particularly on obtaining and interpreting detailed weather information and parameters.

4 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

KNKT acknowledges the safety actions taken by the aircraft operator. However, there are still safety issues remaining to be considered. Therefore, KNKT issued safety recommendations to address safety issues identified in this report.

The safety recommendation in this investigation report is made with the intention of preventing accidents or incidents and which in no case has the purpose of creating a presumption of blame or liability for an accident or incident.

4.1 Matthew Air Nusantara

04.O.2026.04-01

The aircraft operator Operation Manual Part C (OM-C), that contains area, route and aerodrome information, did not include route a guide for a flight from CMA landing spot to GAN1 landing spot. The investigation also did not find any other company document that specified the minimum flight altitude for that particular route.

Based on the filed air traffic control (ATC) flight plan, the helicopter would fly from CMA landing spot to GAN1 landing spot via Nanga Pinoh Airport (WIOG), Melawi at cruising altitude of 1,500 feet. Along the planned route, there was a terrain area with highest terrain elevation of approximately 2,800 feet. This condition indicated that the flight plan had not considered the minimum flight altitude requirement of 1,000 feet above terrain for day VFR operations, as described in the OM-A Subchapter 7.3.1, which may increase the operational risk, particularly flight operations in close proximity to terrain.

Therefore, KNKT recommends Matthew Air Nusantara ensure that route guides, including minimum flight altitudes, are available for each route to be flown and used as references to minimize operational risks, particularly flight operations in close proximity to terrain.

04.O.2026.04-02

The aircraft operator Operation Manual Part A (OM-A) Subchapter 7.5 states that prior commencing VFR flight, pilots are required to obtain the latest available meteorological information including weather reports or forecasts along the route to be flown for ensuring that the flight could be conducted under VFR.

The flight dispatch form signed by the PIC indicated that the meteorological information had been obtained prior to commencing the flight. However, it did not contain weather forecast information along the intended route. The obtained weather information was limited to enhanced infrared weather satellite imagery covering the whole Indonesian territory and weather forecast information for Supadio Airport (WIOO), Pontianak at 0600 LT (1 hours 30 minute before the departure). Those obtained meteorological information is considered not representing the weather conditions along the entire route of flight, and may increase the operational risk, particularly flight operations in close proximity to terrain.

Therefore, KNKT recommends Matthew Air Nusantara ensure that weather report and/or forecast along the route to be flown are available and used as references to minimize operational risks, particularly flight operations in close proximity to terrain.

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