KOMITE NASIONAL KESELAMATAN TRANSPORTASI
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

1st INTERIM STATEMENT

KNKT.24.07.15.04

Aircraft Accident Investigation Report

PT Garuda Indonesia

Airbus A330-343; T7-MMM

Adi Sumarmo International Airport, Solo, Jawa Tengah

Republic of Indonesia

2 July 2024

2025

This Interim Statement was published by the Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (KNKT), Transportation Building, 3rd Floor, Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5 Jakarta 10110, Indonesia.

The Interim Statement is based on the information available at this stage of the investigation by the KNKT in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the Indonesian Aviation Act (UU No. 1/2009), and Government Regulation (PP No. 62/2013). The content of the Interim Statement may be subject to change in the Final Report.

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Jakarta, 29 July 2025
KOMITE NASIONAL
KESELAMATAN TRANSPORTASI
CHAIRMAN

SOERJANTO TJAHJONO

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ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS

ACMI	:	Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance, And Insurance
AOC	:	Air Operator Certificate
APU	:	Auxiliary Power Unit
ARP	:	Aerodrome Reference Point
ATC	:	Air Traffic Controller
ATPL	:	Airline Transport Pilot License
BMKG	:	Badan, Meteorologi, Klimatologi dan Geofisika (the Bureau of Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics of Indonesia)
C of A	:	Certificate of Airworthiness
C of R	:	Certificate of Registration
CASR	:	Civil Aviation Safety Regulation
CPL	:	Commercial Pilot License
CSN	:	Cycles Since New
CVR	:	Cockpit Voice Recorder
ECAM	:	Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring
FA	:	Flight Attendant
FAC	:	Flight Attendant Certificate
FDR	:	Flight Data Recorder
FOHE	:	Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger
ICAO	:	International Civil Aviation Organization
KNKT	:	Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi (is the Indonesia Independent Investigation Authority also known as National Transportation Safety Committee/NTSC)
LP	:	Low Pressure
LT	:	Local Time
OGV	:	Outlet Guide Vane
PF	:	Pilot Flying
PIC	:	Pilot in Command
PM	:	Pilot Monitoring
SAV	:	Starter Air Valve
SIC	:	Second in Command
TDC	:	Top Dead Centre
TSN	:	Time Since New
UTC	:	Universal Time Coordinate

SYNOPSIS

On July 2, 2024, an Airbus 330-343 aircraft, registration T7-MMM, was being operated by PT Garuda Indonesia on an unscheduled passenger Hajj flight from Adi Soemarmo International Airport (WAHQ), Solo, Indonesia, with the intended destination of King Abdul Aziz International Airport (OEJN) Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on flight number GIA6239.

About 1945 LT (1245 UTC), the aircraft departed from Solo. On board the aircraft were three pilots and 11 flight attendants. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF), while the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM), and one pilot acted as augmented captain.

About 1310 UTC, while the aircraft was climbing passed flight level (FL) 340, toward the cruising level of FL380, the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) displayed an ENG 1 STALL warning. This was immediately followed by significant vibrations throughout the aircraft. Afterward, the ECAM displayed the ENG 1 FAIL warning and the ENG LOOP B FAULT warning, followed by all parameters for engine number one dropped.

The SIC declared MAYDAY, reported that the aircraft had experienced an engine failure, and requested return to Solo to the air traffic controller. The flight then flew directly to the SLO VOR/DME.

About 1407 UTC, the aircraft landed using Runway 26. Once the aircraft came to a complete stop on the runway, the PIC shut down engine number two. The PIC opened the cockpit window and noticed a visible glow inside the left engine. At the same time, the augmented captain checked the cabin and confirmed the presence of smoke. Shortly after, smoke and flames were observed around the left engine. An ARFF, which previously entered the runway from the rear of the aircraft using two Oshkosh trucks, approached the aircraft's nose, and one of the ARFF personnel established communication with the PIC. As the fire intensified, the PIC deployed the right door escape slide for evacuation.

At 1419 LT, the ARFF team began spraying water and successfully extinguished the fire several minutes later. During the evacuation, one of the FAs experienced a serious injury. The injured FA was Indonesian. The injured FA sustained a fracture of the distal part of the right fibula and fractures of the base of the 3rd and 4th metatarsals of the right foot.

The notification was immediately sent to the involved parties. The investigation involves Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA), France as the State of Manufacturer (aircraft), San Marino CAA as State of Registry, the Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU), Germany as the State of Design (engine), the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB), United Kingdom as the State of Manufacturer (engine), the Air Accident Investigation Authority (AAIA), Hong Kong as the State providing Information. Each participating State has appointed an accredited representative and accompanying advisers to support the investigation.

The investigation is continuing, and will include a detailed examination of the fan blade fracture surface to determine the cause of the failure, as well as an engine examination to assess the consequences of the occurrence and evaluate the effectiveness of the fire detection system. Should any further relevant safety issues arise during the course of the investigation, the KNKT will promptly notify the appropriate parties and publish the findings as necessary.

1 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the Flight

On July 2, 2024, an Airbus 330-343 aircraft, registration T7-MMM, was being operated by PT Garuda Indonesia on an unscheduled passenger Hajj flight from Adi Soemarmo International Airport (WAHQ)[1], Solo, Indonesia, with the intended destination of King Abdul Aziz International Airport (OEJN)[2] Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on flight number GIA6239. This flight was intended to pick up hajj pilgrims to return to Indonesia.

About 1945 LT (1245 UTC)[3], the aircraft departed from Solo. On board the aircraft were three pilots and 11 flight attendants. The Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as Pilot Flying (PF), while the Second in Command (SIC) acted as Pilot Monitoring (PM), and one pilot acted as augmented captain.

About 1246 UTC, after the departure, the Solo Tower controller instructed the pilot to contact the Yogyakarta Approach (APP) controller. About one minute later, during contact with the Yogyakarta APP controller, and the GIA6239 passed an altitude of about 2,500 feet, the Yogyakarta APP controller responded by instructing the GIA6239 to climb to flight level (FL) 240[4].

About six minutes later, when the aircraft passed an altitude of 11,000 feet, the Yogyakarta APP controller transferred the communication to the Surabaya APP. During the contact with the Surabaya APP controller, the GIA6239 was instructed to climb to flight level FL260 direct to Waypoint KIDET[5], which was acknowledged by the pilot.

About three minutes later, the Surabaya APP controller transferred the communication to the Upper Yogyakarta Area (UJOG) controller, which then the UJOG controller instructed the GIA6239 to climb to flight level FL400. Several seconds later, the pilot requested to fly on flight level FL360, which was then approved by the UJOG controller.

About 10 minutes on the way to the Waypoint KIDET, the pilot requested to climb to flight level FL380, which was approved by the UJOG controller.

About 1310 UTC, while the aircraft was climbing passed FL340, toward the cruising level of FL380, the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system displayed an ENG 1 STALL warning[6]. This was immediately followed by significant vibrations throughout the aircraft. Afterward, the ECAM displayed the ENG 1 FAIL

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1 Adi Soemarmo International Airport (WIII), Solo will be named as Solo for the purpose of this report.

2 King Abdul Aziz International Airport (OEJN), Jeddah will be named as Jeddah for the purpose of this report.

3 The 24-hours clock in Universal Time Coordinated (the time based on atomic clocks), is used in this report to describe the local time as specific events occurred. Local time is UTC+7 hours.

4 At altitude above 13,000 feet in Indonesia, an aircraft height above mean sea level is referred to as a flight level (FL). FL240 equates to 24,000 feet.

5 Waypoint KIDET is located on coordinate 06°18’03.0”S 109°19’37.0”E.

6 According to the Aircraft Maintenance Manual TASK 71-00-00-869-001-B, the ENG 1 STALL which was appear on the ECAM display, means, an engine problem caused by the aerodynamic disruption of the normally smooth airflow through the compressor stages. This disruption of air flow can be caused by several conditions which described in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual TASK 71-00-00-869-001-B.

warning[7] and ENG LOOP B FAULT warning[8], followed by all parameters for engine number one dropped.

In response, the PIC controlled, stabilized the aircraft at FL340, followed ECAM procedures by pushing the ENG 1 fire extinguisher button and agent 1, then started the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU).

The SIC declared a MAYDAY (distress message) to the UJOG controller and requested to maintain FL340. The UJOG controller acknowledged the distress message and approved the request to maintain FL340. The pilot then advised the UJOG controller that the aircraft experienced one engine failure and requested to return to Solo. The UJOG controller then instructed GIA6239 to fly directly to ANY VOR/DME[9] and to descend to FL300. The pilot read back the instructions and requested assistance on arrival.

The pilot then descended the aircraft several times following the instructions from the UJOG controller. The last instruction was to descend to an altitude of 10,000 feet and to fly directly to Waypoint PURWO. The UJOG controller transferred the GIA6239 to the Semarang Approach controller.

The pilot contacted the Semarang Approach controller and requested high priority on arrival due to the one engine failure. The Semarang Approach controller acknowledged the request and instructed the GIA6239 to report when the aircraft flew over ANY VOR/DME.

The pilot then briefed the Flight Attendant of the condition and was prepared for the pilot command after the aircraft landed. The pilots also evaluated the condition and decided to divert to Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta. The pilot then requested to divert to Jakarta to the Semarang Approach controller and was instructed to contact Upper Semarang Area (USMG).

During the initial contact with the USMG controller, the FA reported to the pilot that the cabin pressure warning light on door 4L flashed. The pilot then changed the decision to continue the flight to Solo and advised the USMG controller.

The USMG controller instructed GIA6239 to contact the Surabaya APP controller. The pilot advised to Surabaya APP controller that the flight was at an altitude of 10,000 feet and directed to Waypoint PURWO.

The pilot attempted to request a descent clearance to the Surabaya APP controller four times, and no response. The pilot then decided to fly directly to SLO VOR/DME[10] and called the Solo Tower controller.

About 1351 UTC, the pilot made an initial contact with the Solo Tower controller by reporting their emergency condition. The Solo Tower controller acknowledged the report and advised that the assistant on arrival was ready. The Solo Tower controller

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[7] According to the AMM TASK 72-00-00-810-806-A, the ENG 1 FAIL warning which was appear on the ECAM display, means that the engine rolls back sub idle. This is a fail state after a previous failure mode had been declared in the ECAM when the engine rotation below fifty percent of N2 with the associated engine master lever switched to the ON position.

[8] ENG 1 LOOP B FAULT warning which was appear on the ECAM display means that there was an inoperation condition which was detected by the Fire Detection Unit as result of several conditions asdescribed in the AMM chapter 26-12-00.

[9] ANY VOR/DME is a radio beacon that combines a VHF omnidirectional range (VOR) with a distance-measuring equipment (DME) which located on coordinate 06°58’28.9”S 110°22’48.4”E.

[10] SLO VOR/DME is located on coordinate 07°30’27.78”S 110°47’39.86”E.

also instructed the GIA6239 to descend to 3,000 feet and advised that the flight had sequence number one for landing using Runway 26.

About 1407 UTC, the aircraft landed, and during the landing roll, the PIC observed an Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) vehicle positioned on Taxiway A, to the right of the aircraft. Once the aircraft came to a complete stop on the runway, the PIC shut down engine number two. The PIC opened the cockpit window and noticed a visible glow inside the engine number one. At the same time, the augmented captain checked the cabin and confirmed the presence of smoke. Shortly after, smoke and flames were observed around engine number one. An ARFF vehicle approached the aircraft's nose, and one of the ARFF personnel established communication with the PIC.

As the fire intensified, the PIC revised the original evacuation plan and instructed the flight attendant to initiate an emergency evacuation using the forward right cabin door slide. The PIC deployed the slide, and with the APU still running, cabin lighting remained available to support the evacuation.

The flight attendants exited first, followed by the SIC, the augmented captain, and the PIC. The entire evacuation was completed in approximately four minutes.

At 1419 LT, the ARFF team began spraying water and successfully extinguished the fire several minutes later.

1.2 Injuries to Persons

During the evacuation, one of the FAs experienced a serious injury. The injured FA was Indonesian. The injured FA sustained a fracture of the distal part of the right fibula and fractures of the base of the 3rd and 4th metatarsals of the right foot.

1.3 Damage to Aircraft

The aircraft sustained damage to the left engine, with no damage observed on other parts of the aircraft.

The details of the damage to engine number one are as follows:

- One fan blade at position 26 was fractured approximately 23 cm from the base of the blade root. The released section of the blade aerofoil and associated debris were contained within the fan case and nose cowl.
- Significant rubbing and damage were observed around the entire 360º circumference of the fan case rotor path. Impact damage was also present on the nose cowl acoustic panels.

Figure 1: The fan blade release and heavy rubbing around the fan case.

- Burning of the fan case kevlar wrap was visible around the engine's Top Dead Centre (TDC) region, as shown by Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: The damage to the Kevlar layer

- Two LP fuel tubes upstream of the Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) were found fractured, as shown in Figure 3 below.



Figure 3: Fractured LP fuel tubes upstream of the Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger

- The starter air duct pipe was fractured, and a large section, including the Starter Air Valve (SAV), had detached as shown in Figure 4 below.



Figure 4: The detached starter air duct pipe, including the Starter Air Valve (SAV).

1.4 Other Damage

There was no other damage to property and/or the environment.

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 The Pilot in Command

The Pilot in Command (PIC) was of French nationality and held a valid Airline Transport Pilot License (ATPL) rated for Airbus A330 aircraft. The PIC also possessed a valid Class I medical certificate without any medical limitations.

The PIC had a total flying time of 12,400 hours, including 4,200 hours on Airbus A330 aircraft. The last line check was conducted on 15 May 2024, and the last proficiency check was conducted on 28 April 2024.

1.5.2 The Second in Command

The Second in Command (SIC) was of Croatian nationality and held a valid Commercial Pilot License (CPL) rated for Airbus A330 aircraft. The SIC also possessed a valid Class I medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses due to defective distance vision.

The SIC had a total flying time of 1,122 hours, including 124 hours on Airbus A330 aircraft. The last proficiency check was conducted on 9 April 2024.

1.5.3 Augmented Captain

The augmented captain was of French nationality and held a valid Airline Transport Pilot License (ATPL) rated for Airbus A330 aircraft. The augmented captain also possessed a valid Class I medical certificate with a limitation for corrective lenses due to defective near vision.

The augmented captain had a total flying time of 16,500 hours, including 4,333 hours on Airbus A330 aircraft. The last line check was conducted on 24 June 2024, and the last proficiency check was conducted on 29 April 2024.

1.5.4 Flight Attendant

All flight attendants (FAs) were Indonesians who held valid Flight Attendant Certificate (FAC), qualified as Airbus 330 FA, and certified in an adapted conversion course by San Marino Executive Aviation. The FA also held valid Class II medical certificates.

1.6 Aircraft Information

1.6.1 General

The Airbus A330-343, serial number 1358, was manufactured by Airbus, France, in 2012. The aircraft, registered as T7-MMM, had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) and Certificate of Registration (C of R). The aircraft had accumulated 37,327 flight hours and completed 12,737 flight cycles.

The aircraft was powered by two Trent 772B-60/16 engines, manufactured by Rolls-Royce in the United Kingdom. Engine number one (left engine), serial number 42132, was installed on 20 February 2024, with 34,732 flight hours and 10,825 cycles. Engine number two (right engine), serial number 42133, was installed on 5 January 2024, with 34,604 flight hours and 10,798 cycles.

On the day of the occurrence, the aircraft was deemed airworthy and was dispatched for the flight, operating within the appropriate weight and balance limits.

1.6.2 Engine Installation History

Engine number one was manufactured in September 2012, and its installation history was as follows:

- September 2012 to January 2016, operated by Hainan Airlines,
- January 2016 to March 2024 operated by Hong Kong Airlines,
- March 2024 to the date of the occurrence operated by San Marino Executive Aviation.

1.6.3 The Fractured Blade

The fractured fan blade, part number FW23741 and serial number RRWCFBRGF47579, was manufactured in September 2012 with no concessions applied and had been installed at position 26 since the engine was first built.

Trent 700 fan blades require an ultrasonic inspection every 1,200 engine flight cycles to detect subsurface anomalies in the high stress areas of the aerofoil and mitigate against fan blade release events. The blades must be removed from the fan disc, and the inspection can be achieved using an automated C-scan technique in-shop, or using a water-coupled phased array technique, which is performed near the wing.

The fan blades of engine number one were last inspected in October 2023 at 10,236 cycles since new, approximately 580 cycles prior to the occurrence. The inspection was accomplished using the water-coupled phased array technique according to NMSB 72-AH465, revision 8. No findings were reported, and no blades in the set were rejected.

1.7 Meteorological Information

The meteorological report published by the *Badan Meteorologi Klimatologi dan Geofisika* (Bureau of Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics) on 2 July 2024, for the day of occurrence at 1330 UTC and 1400 UTC was as follows:

Time (UTC)	1330	1400
Wind (°/knots)	210/06	180/08

Time (UTC)	1330	1400
Visibility (km)	6	6
Weather	NIL	NIL
Cloud	SCT 1500 FT	SCT 1500 FT
TT/TD (°C)	27/23	27/23
QNH (mb/in Hg)	1012/29.90	1012/29.90
QFE (mb/in Hg)	998/29.47	998/29.48
Remarks	NIL	NIL

1.8 Aids to Navigation

Ground-based navigation aids/onboard navigation aids/aerodrome visual ground aids and their serviceability were not a factor in this occurrence.

1.9 Communications

All communications between air traffic controller and the flightcrew were recorded by ground-based automatic voice recording equipment and CVR for the duration of the flight. The quality of the aircraft's recorded transmissions was good.

1.10 Aerodrome Information

Adi Soemarmo Airport is operated by PT Angkasa Pura I[11]. It has a runway azimuth of 08/26, with dimensions of 2,500 meters in length and 45 meters in width.

The airport sits at an elevation of 418 feet, and its aerodrome reference point is located at coordinates 07º30'49" S, 110º45'02" E.

The ARFF service of the airport is classified as a Category 9, equipped with various specialized vehicles and equipment to manage emergency situations. These include one Foam Tender Type I, one Foam Tender Type II, one Foam Tender Type IV, and a Nurse Tender, which is scheduled for asset disposal. The ARFF also has one Commando Car, three ambulances, and one utility vehicle.

The water reserve for firefighting purposes is 100,800 litres, with a response time of approximately 1 minute and 36 seconds. This airport did not have available facilities and equipment for the removal of damaged aircraft.

1.11 Flight Recorders

1.11.1 Flight Data Recorder

The aircraft was fitted with an HFR5-D Flight Data Recorder (FDR) manufactured by Honeywell with part number 980-4750-001 and serial number FDR-02284.

[11] At the time of publishing this Interim Statement, PT Angkasa Pura I has been merged with other company and became PT Angkasa Pura Indonesia.

KNKT successfully downloaded the flight data, which consists of about 26 hours, 45 minutes, and 15 seconds of aircraft operation, including the occurrence flight. The details of the flight recorder data will be discussed in the Final Report.

1.11.2 Cockpit Voice Recorder

The aircraft was fitted with a solid-state Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) manufactured by Honeywell with part number 980-6022-001 and serial number CVR 120-15806. KNKT successfully downloaded the CVR data and confirmed that the communication along the flight was recorded in the CVR. The details of the CVR data will be discussed in the Final Report.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

The release of a fan blade occurred in engine number one, where it penetrated the aluminium fan case and retention panel, lodging into the Kevlar shroud. The fan case was completely worn through at the impact site. Despite the significant impact, the retention panel remained mostly intact, though signs of overheating and friction were evident. Burned Kevlar was observed around the Top Dead Center (TDC) location, with the Kevlar coating completely burned through.

The front acoustic panels, located near the impact area, sustained severe damage, while the rear acoustic panels were either absent or severely damaged. A Kevlar wave was also detected in the area, which caused significant damage to the starter duct and led to the expulsion of a large portion of the duct along with the Starting Air Valve (SAV).

A substantial portion of the fan blade aerofoil was found lodged between the Outlet Guide Vane (OGV) and the rear of the fan rotor. Three annulus fillers were also missing from the engine area. Additionally, debris spiralling forward due to the engine's rotation caused noticeable impact damage to the nose cowl. The honeycomb structure and facing sheet of the nose cowl also sustained impact damage from the debris.

Further examination of the wreckage revealed several detached components within the engine cowl, including ignition units, a remote charge converter, a section of the starter duct, and the SAV. Two low-pressure (LP) fuel supply lines were found to be cracked due to impact.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

Medical and pathological information were not available at the time of the issuance of this interim statement. Should any medical or pathological information be obtained that is relevant to this investigation, it will be included in the final report.

1.14 Fire

An ECAM alert signalled the detection of a fire during flight. The augmented captain, who saw the engine from the passenger cabin, only saw sparks at the tip of the fan blade. The aircraft landed with a spark in the fan blade tip of the engine number one, prompting the PIC to stop it on the runway. ARFF personnel entered the runway from the rear of the aircraft using two Oshkosh trucks, type 1 (12,500 litres of water and 1,750 litres of foam) and type 2 (11,600 litres of water and 1,500 litres of foam).

The evidence of sparks on the fan case developed into flames that were visible around the top of the fan case.

At 1419 LT, the ARFF team began spraying water and successfully extinguished the fire ~~a~~bout 1445 UTC.

1.15 Survival Aspects

The survival aspect information will be included in the Final Report.

1.16 Tests and Research

At the time of publishing this 1st Interim Statement, several tests had been conducted on the engine and the fractured blade. As the test and research of the relevant part of the engine are ongoing, the details of the test results will be included in the Final Report.

1.17 Organizational and Management Information

1.17.1 Aircraft Operator

The aircraft was operated by PT Garuda Indonesia for Hajj pilgrim flights under a wet leased[12] agreement from San Marino Executive Aviation. The PT Garuda Indonesia held a valid Air Operator Certificate (AOC) with the number 121-001.

1.17.2 Aircraft Lessor

San Marino Executive Aviation, the owner of the aircraft, is an aircraft operator registered in the Republic of San Marino. The lessor held a valid Air Operator Certificate (AOC) number SM017.

The scope of the lease agreement between PT Garuda Indonesia and San Marino Executive Aviation was subject to appointment by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, allowing the lessee to conduct hajj transportation for 2024. The lessor agreed to lease one Airbus A330-300 aircraft, bearing registration mark T7-MMM with manufacturer's serial number 1358, for hajj operations in the years 2024, 2025, 2026, and 2027 based on an Aircraft Crew Maintenance and Insurance (ACMI) lease agreement.

1.18 Additional Information

Participating in this investigation are the Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses (BEA), France as the State of Manufacturer (aircraft), San Marino CAA as State of Registry, the Bundesstelle für Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU), Germany as the State of Design (engine), the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB), United Kingdom as the State of Manufacturer (engine), the Air Accident Investigation Authority (AAIA), Hong Kong as the State providing Information. Each participating State has appointed an accredited representative and accompanying advisers to support the investigation.

The investigation is continuing and will include a detailed examination of the fan blade fracture surface to determine the cause of the failure, as well as an engine examination to assess the consequences of the occurrence and evaluate the effectiveness of the fire detection system.

[12] Wet lease is a lease where the aircraft is provided with the flight crew.

Should any further relevant safety issues arise during the course of the investigation, the KNKT will promptly notify the appropriate parties and publish the findings as necessary.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

The investigation was conducted in accordance with the KNKT approved policies and procedures and in accordance with the standards and recommended practices of Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention.

2 SAFETY ACTION

At the time of issuing this draft Final Report, the KNKT had been informed of safety actions resulting from this occurrence taken by the related parties.

2.1 ROLLS-ROYCE DEUTSCHLAND Ltd & Co KG and EASA

In June 2025, Rolls-Royce published an Alert Non-Modification Service Bulletin (NMSB) number RB.211−72−AL191, which was covered by the EASA Airworthiness Directive (AD) number 2025-0144 (ATA 72 – Engine – Low Pressure Compressor Blades – Inspection) that was published on 9 July 2025.

The EASA AD introduces improvements to the fan blade inspection procedure and instructs sequenced once around the fleet inspections of RB211 Trent 768-60, 772-60, 772B-60, and 772C-60 engines (all serial numbers). These engines are known to be installed on, but not limited to, Airbus A330 aircraft. The AD is to be effective on 16 July 2025.

The link to the AD is available on https://ad.easa.europa.eu/ by searching with the keyword 2025-0144 or 25-093.

3 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

The KNKT acknowledges the safety actions taken by Roll-Royce and EASA and considers that the safety actions were relevant to improve safety. Therefore, KNKT does not issue a safety recommendation at the time of publishing this Interim Statement.

4 APPENDICES

N/A

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